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ABSTRACT 
 
This work analyzes the evolution of real public expenditures of local and regional 
administrations (LRA), in Portugal, in the period after the Second World War. It also 
aims to estimate the elasticities associated to determinants, which explain the found 
growth. As most relevant results, it is focused that real public expenditures of LRA did 
not increase in a constant way – the most significant period of growth was between 1975 
and 1990. A long-term relation was found among real public expenditures of LRA (as a 
proportion of real Gross National Product), the Number of Employees in Public 
Administration, the Number of Unemployed and Public Revenues. These results are 
consistent with modern versions of Wagner’s Laws, with the role of lobbying groups and 
with the bureaucracy being a source of discouragement referring to the decentralized 
public expenditures. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
How did a decentralized public expenditure in Portugal develop after the Second 
World War? And why? These questions are the beginning of the following discussion. 
The study of the evolution of national public expenditures has received the focus 
from some researchers such as, for example, André and Delorme (1978), Beck (1981), 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1980), Trotman-Dickenson (1996), Rosen (1998), Demirbas 
(1999) or Jackson et al. (1999). We can point Carreira (1989), Silva and Neves (1992), 
Afonso (2000) or Bronchi (2003) being some analysts for the Portuguese aggregates.  
 The major contribute of this work is to give evidence to the fact that a 
decentralized public outlay of Portugal – the real public expenditures of local and 
regional administrations (LRA) - had distinct phases of growth but, mainly, to show that 
determinants of this evolution can be explained. These determinants are the Number of 
Unemployed, the Number of Public Administration Employees and Public Revenues. 
 For the study of the first suggestion (which consists in the heterogeneous 
development of real public expenditures of Portuguese LRA), I used a Markov Switching 
Model, which is a method used for identifying structural breaks in time series. For testing 
the long-term relation among the introduced determinants and real public expenditures of 
LRA, as a ratio of Portuguese real Gross National Product (GNP), I used the traditional 
framework of proceedings to evaluate the cointegration relation among economic 
variables. 
 Via the Long Series of the Bank of Portugal data, observed between 1947 and 
2002, I intended to appreciate the evolution of the Portuguese real public expenditures of 
LRA and to find evidence favoring some determinants suggested by the Economic 
Literature. Some theories are introduced to explain the growth of public expenditures. We 
can report them in two groups: Theories of the growth of public expenditures because of 
movements on Demand or, alternatively, on Supply of the goods and services provided 
by the Government. In the first group, in addition to the seminal work of Wagner (1883), 
we find Downs (1957), Peacock and Wiseman (1961), Buchanan and Wagner (1977) or 
Cameron (1978). In the second “school”, we can point Niskanen (1971), Bush and 
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Denzau (1977), Beck (1981) or Castles (1982). For testing the significance of the long 
term relation among some economic variables pointed by the two groups of researchers, I 
appealed to a Model derived from Median Voter Theory, developed by Kirchgässner and 
Pommerehne (1997). 
 This work is organized as the following: Section 2 is composed by a conceptual 
framework; Section 3 explains the application of the Markov Switching Model, 
introducing data and some results; Section 4 synthesizes the major theories which try to 
explain the growth of public expenditures; in Section 5 it will be inserted the discussion 
influenced by the Median Voter Theory, describing data, the purposed Methodology and 
the returned estimations; Section 6 presents the conclusion. 
 
 
Section 2: A conceptual framework  
 
In the last 50 years, many countries have been characterized by the phenomenon 
of the growth of their public expenditures. However, it is particularly necessary to define 
the phenomenon and to specify the object of this work.  
The phenomenon is restricted to an analysis on the evolution of the Portuguese 
real public expenditures of Local and Regional Administrations (LRA), between the 
years 1947 to 2002. These temporal limits focus on the period after the Second World 
War to nowadays (beginning of the Twenty-First century). 
The object of this study is identified with an economic aggregate – the real public 
expenditures of LRA– that can be described as the global amount of deflated 
expenditures spent by decentralized instances of Portuguese public administration.  
The Long Series of the Bank of Portugal mainly provided data. 
Without intending to give an exhaustive list of authors, we can find some national 
studies on the growth of public expenditures, for example, by Trotman-Dickenson (1996) 
who gave attention to the English reality. Musgrave and Musgrave (1980), Rosen (1998) 
or Beck (1981) studied the Public Expenditures of the United States of America. Some 
European studies were developed by André and Delorme (1978), who analyzed the 
evolution of French Public Outlays, by Demirbas (1999), who observed the Turkish 
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aggregates, or by Jackson, Fethi and Fethi (1999) who studied the Northern Cyprian 
expenditures. In Portugal, we can cite Medina Carreira (1989), Silva and Neves (1992), 
Afonso (2000) or Bronchi (2003), among many others. Alternatively, for example, we 
can find Manasan (1985), who analyzed the public finances of Philippines. 
In general, only after 1985, different indicators assumed a stabilization of the 
growth of public expenditures. 
Analyzing Figures A1, A2, A3 and A4, we find four representations that express 
the evolution of the logs of the following Portuguese public expenditures series: Total 
LRA Expenditures in nominal terms, Total LRA Expenditures in real terms, percentual 
relation between nominal Total LRA expenditures and nominal Gross Nominal Product, 
and percentual relation between real Total LRA expenditures and real Gross Nominal 
Product. According to Musgrave and Musgrave (1980) and Beck (1981), Portuguese 
Public Expenditures were deflated by a calibrated average between Public Consumption 
Deflator Index and Private Consumption Deflator Index. As usually, its own index 
deflated nominal Gross Domestic Product. 
Due to the suggested development and according to Herber (1971), we are 
tempted to graphically recognize Wagner’s Hypothesis: under pre or post 
industrialization efforts, the growth of public expenditures has slower rates than those 
related to periods characterized by vigorous industrialization. In these periods of strong 
industrialization, Government’s expenditures try to follow efforts of the private sector. 
However, Wagner’s Hypothesis, according to this suggestion, purposes an “S” curve. 
Watching the first figure (A1), it seems that, between 1947 and 1975 and between 1992 
and 2002, the public expenditures aggregate has been defined by slower growth rates than 
those observed between 1975 and 1992. We can depurate this suggestion using the real 
public Expenditures of LRA whose representation highlights some inflexion points, 
associated to the observations of the middle of 1970, reported by the lectures on graphics 
A3 and A4 (percentual relation between nominal and real total public expenditure and, 
respectively, nominal and real gross nominal product). 
Annual average growth rates of the Portuguese LRA public expenditures, between 
1947 and 2002, are: 13,09% (nominal series), 5,51% (real series), 1,74% (percentual 
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relation between nominal LRA expenditures and nominal GDP) and 1,60% (percentual 
relation between real expenditures of LRA and real GDP). 
Section 3: the behaviour of real public expenditures of LRA in Portugal: some 
evidence through a Markov-Switching Model 
 
 The analysis of structural shifts in a time series context is due to authors like 
Quandt (1958), Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) and Cosslett and Lee (1985). According to 
Maddala and Kim (1998), Quandt (1958) has begun with a dichotomic suggestion that 
was used to describe a time series. Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) purposed the introduction 
of constant transition probabilities between two different regimes, which could 
characterize a series, incorporating the concept of markov chain. However, this sort of 
Markov switching regressions became more popular after Hamilton’s (1989) seminal 
work. 
 In Hamilton (1989), the phases (“regimes”) of contraction or expansion are 
modeled as switching regimes of the inherent stochastic process: 
 
ttttttt usysysy +-D++-D=-D ---- ))((...))(()( 442111 mamam    (1) 
 
 In (1), these two regimes are defined by two different conditional distributions of 
the growth rate of real output ( tyD ), where m , the mean growth rate, is depending on the 
state ts . So, 1m  is expected to be negative (contraction) and 2m is expected to be positive 
(expansion). In his original work, Hamilton (1989) used a unique variance of the 
disturbance term, independently of the regimes, ),0(~ 2sNIDut . 
 An ergodic Markov chain generates the stochastic process. This ergodic Markov 
chain is defined by the transition probabilities (2): 
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 With a two-regime business cycle, there are two transition probabilities: 
 
p12 = Pr (recession in t | expansion in t-1) 
p21 = Pr (expansion in t | recession in t-1) 
 
These transition probabilities should be estimated together with the parameters of 
equation (1), as stated by Krolzig (2001). For this aim, we can appeal to the Expectation-
Maximization algorithm that was discussed by Hamilton (1990). 
 To analyze the regimes that characterize the evolution of the Portuguese LRA real 
expenditures, between 1947 and 2002, firstly, I extracted the global data from the Long 
Series of the Bank of Portugal until 1995 and, after this period, from an official 
document, which describes, a posteriori, a budgetary year  – the Estate General Account, 
“Conta Geral do Estado”. 
 After the data collection, the (nominal) series were deflated, using the 
contribution of Musgrave and Musgrave (1980) and Beck (1981) where the global 
expenditures suffer the effect of a calibrated average between the deflators of public and 
private consumption. At last, the logs of real series were first-differenced to create a new 
series: the growth rate of Portuguese LRA real expenditures. 
 To select the number of lags included in a markov switching regression, it is 
preferred to minimize the returned values by the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), 
Hanna-Quinn Criteria (HQ) or Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria (SC). The Table 
A1 synthesizes the results according to different number of lags (from 0 to 5). 
 Observing Table A1, no lags will be included in the regression. 
 To discuss the correct number of regimes, Ang and Beckaert’s (1998) suggestion 
was followed. According to these authors, we can use the distribution )(2 qc  to test the 
validity of some restrictions, where q is identified with the number of restrictions to be 
tested. Usually, the restrictions are formulated to test the equivalence between two means 
or between two variances, parameters associated to different regimes. 
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 Testing two restrictions (equivalence between the means and between the 
variances of two states), I got a value of 8,85. According to this value, we can reject the 
null hypothesis of a single regime (the associated p-value is 1,19%).  
 In the sequence of these tests, the series associated to the growth rates in the real 
public expenditures of LRA (DDTOTR) will be suggested by a Markov Switching Model 
with state-dependent mean and variance. This model has two regimes and no lags of the 
regressand are included as regressors: 
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 The estimated parameters of the model (3) are shown in Table A2. The estimation 
of parameters and the figures A1 and A2 were brought in from MSVAR module, version 
1.3, for Ox v.3.3. 
The regime-associated probabilities are referred in Figure A1 panels. The filtered 
probability can be understood as an optimal inference on the state variable (identifying a 
contraction or an expansion phase) at time t getting the information up to time t : 
 
Pr (st | y1,…,yt;è) 
 
The smoothed probability gives the optimal inference on the regime at time t 
considering the full sample information: 
 
Pr (st | y1,…,yT; è) 
 
The set of population parameters, è, is identified with 
 
),,,,,( 22112121 ppssmmq =  
 
  However, è collects the information concerning the regimes: which means, 
standard deviations and persistence probabilities. 
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From an integral lecture on Figure A1 and on data present in Table A2 we can 
suggest that the growth rates of the real public expenditures of Portuguese LRA, in the 
last 54 years, had two states. Regime 1 (low rates) was found between 1948 and 1972 and 
between 1989 and 2002. This phase has a mean growth rate of about 4,58%. Regime 2 
(high rates) took place between 1973 and 1988 with a mean growth rate of 7,46%. The 
respective standard errors associated to states 1 and 2 are 0,053 and 0,115. 
 In following periods, some political events marked the course of Portugal: 
- From 1961 until 1975, Portugal was involved in a military conflict, against 
independentist forces from the actual States of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-
Bissau, S. Tomé and Principe and Cabo Verde. These States were then 
recognized as Ultramarine Provinces. 
- The Economic Development Policy, during the decade of 1960, had a special 
vigour in the “Planos de Fomento”, macro programs organized for five years 
that were obligatory to the Public Sector and relating to the Private Sector, 
evolving the modernization of Central and Local Public Administrations and 
the building of some important infrastructures (roads, airports and 
hydroelectric centrals). 
- In 1974, a political revolution, started by a military coup on 25th April, 
substituted the II Republic, the Corporative, for the (actual) III Republic, the 
Democratic. 
- At the end of the 1970-decade, the Internationa l Monetary Fund acts on the 
Portuguese financial situation, imposing restrictions on the performance of the 
public finances. This fact marks the beginning of a period of slow growth 
rates in the aggregate of the public expenditures. 
- Since 1986, Portugal became part of the European Economic Community. 
This fact had accentuated the interdependence of public finances aggregates, 
as public expenditures, in an International context.  
Since 1974, partisans disputing electoral moments have characterized the 
democratic experience. But the simple visualization on Figures A1, A2, A3 or A4 does 
not seem to suggest significant political influences on DDTOTR. We point this 
observation based on the absence of structural shifts in the series, caused by electoral 
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moments, since 1980. A possible hypothesis of justification is found in the preferred 
classification of real public expenditures of LRA. Due to the economic classification, it is 
very difficult to identify shifts in the series. If functional or organic classifications were 
preferred we could expect different perceptions motivated by electoral moments. 
Combining the evidence, the period of higher growth of this series starts with the 
transition period between the two models of Republic Systems (1974-1976), and it was 
delayed until the end of the decade of 1980, where we can recognize the influence of the 
European integration, with other sources of challenges to national budgetary policies. 
The transition matrix (Pij ) is given by 
 
Pij = ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
893,00,107
0461,00,954
 
 
So, we expect that State 1 has a prevalence of 22 years while State 2 remains, on 
average, during 9 years. This duration is calculated by 
iip-1
1 . 
Observing the Figure A2, the desired statistical properties of the estimated 
residues can be induced. So, we confirm the absence of significant residual 
autocorrelation and the absence of residual non-normality. 
 
Section 4: Theories on the growth of Public Expenditures: a synthesis  
 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Adolph Wagner (1883) enunciated 
two purposes of explanation on the growth of public expenditures. The first of Wagner’s 
explanations identified the social transformation between a society based on primary 
activities (as agriculture or fishery) and a society with the rising of the industrial sector. 
The second “law” of Wagner suggested that public goods were characterized by higher 
income elasticities (as, in a microeconomics context, the luxury goods): so, with rising 
national product and national income, public expenditures tended to grow. 
 Peacock and Wiseman (1961) identified “Displacement Effects” as a reason for 
the shift of the demand of public goods and services. Facing obligations assumed during 
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special periods, like wars or social convulsions, governments have difficulties when they 
try to re-establish the structures of public expenditures, which were verified before these 
unusual moments. Therefore, there is a tendency to increase the amount of public outlays.   
 Other authors, as Downs (1957), Romer and Rosenthal (1979) or Meltzer and 
Richard (1981) appealed to the redistribution processes as a possible cause of public 
growth expenditures. 
 Buchanan and Wagner (1977) or Romer (1999) argue that imperfect knowledge 
promote the growth of budgetary deficits (a popular example is the fiscal illusion). In the 
context of understanding what stresses public expenditures attending on the demand side, 
Tabellini and Alesina (1990) wrote about the public strategic debt choice, Alesina and 
Drazen (1991) studied the absence of an agreement among political forces and Rogoff 
(1990) pointed fiscal cycles as possible reasons. 
 Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Cameron (1978) and Becker (1983) also 
appreciated the role of lobbying groups as motors of the public growth expenditures. 
  
 However, there remains a set of authors who argue that the strongest focus on the 
public growth expenditures should be put on Supply-Side. 
 Baumol (1967), Beck (1981) and Pommerehne and Schneider (1982) identify the 
relative prices (between private and public deflators) and the inelastic demand being the 
main cause of the evolution of public budgetary outlays.  
 Frey and Schneider (1981) wrote about the temporal distance between electoral 
moments as responsible events for expenditures cyclical peaks.  
Niskanen (1971) and Romer and Rosenthal (1978) study this problem according 
to an Adverse Selection perspective: because of the absence of precise knowledge of 
budget consequences, decision-makers, often, make the most expensive choice. This 
choice is especially interesting to bureaucrat groups. 
 Bush and Denzau (1977), Frey and Pommerehne (1984), Cameron (1978) and 
Castles (1982) also observe the bureaucratic preferences, but now bureaucrats are studied 
as representative voters. 
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 Castles (1982) developed other explanation - he finds ideological differences (of 
“right” or “left” parties) as contributors to the observed differences in outlays during 
legislative governments.  
Brennan and Buchanan (1977) and Oates (1985) advise to the heterogeneous bias 
because of decentralized decisions (sometimes, there is an increment of public 
expenditures, sometimes, a reduction is observed).  
Wildavsky (1964) recognizes that institutional causes (for example, what is 
behind a budgetary decision) may influence the rhythms of public expenditures growth.  
 
Section 5: The Model of Median Voter as a suggestion of the elasticities of real 
public expenditures of LRA 
 
After these studies, two questions remain:  
- Is there a long-term relationship among real public expenditures of LRA and a 
set of explicative variables? 
- And if there is, what are the estimated elasticities? 
 In an Economic context, the notion of elasticity suggests the response of a 
variable to percentual changes in another variable, coeteris paribus. According to Greene 
(2003), the estimation is often purposed by log-linear models.  
To describe the behaviour associated to a political decision-maker, I will suggest 
a model related to the discussion envolving the median voter, as stated by Kirchgässner 
and Pommerehne (1997). So that a political decision-maker – a government or the 
median voter – wants to maximize the utility associated to the following objective 
function:   
 
),,,,( DTTrqxUU =         (3) 
 
with x designating the private set of disposable goods and services, q the public 
acquirable basket of goods and services, Tr the Public Transfers to the private sector, T 
the Public Revenues and D the Public Deficit. The Marginal Utilities are positive for x, q 
and Tr; T and D have negative marginal utilities. 
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We have to fulfill two restrictions. The first one synthesizes the Gross National 
Product (Y): 
 
qx pqpxY ** +=         (4) 
 
px and pq are, respectively, two variables associated to the private consumption 
price index and to the public consumption price series. 
The second restriction is the popular budget constraint: 
0**** =--+ DTTrq pDpTpTrpq      (5) 
where ptr, pt, and pd are respectively identified with the valorizations given to the 
Transfers, to the Public Revenues and to the Budget value. 
In the median voter discussion it is usual to develop the model starting by an 
indirect utility function: 
),,,,,( YpppppVV DTTrqx=        (6) 
This indirect utility function has the following expected marginal utilities: 
Vpx<0          (7) 
Vpq<0          (8) 
Vptr<0          (9) 
Vpt>0          (10) 
Vpd>0          (11) 
Vy>0          (12) 
The indirect utility function will be maximized according to (5) and respecting the 
transformed constraint (13): 
0**** =--+
Y
p
D
Y
p
T
Y
p
Tr
Y
p
q DTTrq      (13) 
As a solution, a “system of demand functions” is returned, specifically, an AIDS  
(“Almost Ideal Demand System”), which has ratios assuming the variables: 
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where p1=pq, p2=pTr, p3=pT, p4=pD and p5=px. 
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P* is assumed as the Gross National Product Price Index. The variables zj are 
explicative variables of the decisions in public budget.  
Additionally, there are some restrictions in order to offer a solution to the AIDS : 
04321 =--+ aaaa         (15) 
04321 =--+ bbbb       (16) 
4,...,1,04321 ==--+ jjjjj gggg       (17) 
kjjjjj ,...,1,04321 ==--+ dddd     (18) 
151 =+aa          (19) 
051 =+ bb          (20) 
5,...,2,051 ==+ jjj gg        (21) 
kjjj ,...,1,051 ==+ dd        (22) 
 
According to the Demand Theory, the symmetry between the coefficients 
associated to the relative prices can be suggested as 
5,...,2,, == jijiij gg         (23) 
We can also conceive that the fluctuation of prices, concerning Transfers, Taxes 
and the Deficit, is equivalent:  
4,3,2,, == jipp ji         (24) 
However, as interesting prices in this AIDS , we have P*, pq (public consumption 
price index) and px (private consumption price index). These equivalences (15-24) reduce 
the complexity in the system.  
Now, we are able to estimate the elasticities of the set of suggested exogenous 
variables in a model where real public expenditures of LRA of Portugal are the 
regressand.  
The set of some exogenous variables, as suggested in Section 3, is composed by 
the following: 
- Real Gross National Product (usually, this variable appears as exogenous in 
models in which Wagner’s Hypotheses are tested; it is expected that the 
estimated coefficient returns positive values); 
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- Number of Unemployed people (this variable can be interpreted, 
simultaneously, as a target-group of redistributive public pretensions and as a 
lobbying crowd; it is not sure that the estimated coefficient is characterized by 
positive amounts, what could induce a complementary relation between real 
public expenditures of LRA and national current transfers, for example; if a 
negative signal characterizes the estimated coefficient, it can be due to an 
inherent relation of substitutability); 
- Number of Employees in Public Administration (this variable is tested for 
analyzing the power of bureaucracy as an explanatory variable in the growth 
of expenditures; as verified with the Number of Unemployed people, there is 
not an unique direction of the predictable signal of the estimated coefficient); 
- Public Revenues (According to Barbosa (1997), as another instrument of 
Budgetary Policy, this variable is used because it can induce positive effects 
on public expenditures, as suggested by the traditional short-term budget 
restriction; thus it is expected that the estimated coefficient has a positive 
signal). 
Therefore, according to the specifications of the AIDS , in a first step it is intended 
to estimate the long-term relation among real public expenditures of LRA (LDTOTR), 
real GNP (LPIBR) and the zj variables (Number of Unemployed, Number of Public 
Administration Employees and Public Revenues). Thus the following cointegration 
regression was estimated: 
å
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+++=
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** gda     (25) 
However, some authors like Musgrave (1969) and Gupta (1967) purpose to test 
public expenditures as a ratio of production: 
å
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*da      (26) 
 
A short appointment should be introduced here. It is related to the omission of 
political variables, like years of elections or periods characterized by the governance of a 
party. Using dummies variables for years of (legislative, municipal or presidential) 
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elections, there was no statistical significance of the estimated parameters detected. A 
hypothesis for this apparent irrelevance of political explanations in the growth of 
Portuguese public expenditures is due to the preferred classification of public 
expenditures. If organic classification was chosen, which divides public expenditures 
according to outlays as Defense, Education, Health or Social Security (in the place of the 
preferred economic one), then it would be probable that a different lecture could have 
been done, as noted in Section 2. A second reason points out the unaltered regime felt for 
almost twenty years in Portugal, as Figure A2 expresses it. 
 
DATA 
 
The characterization of the logaritmized variables is the following: 
LDTOTR is identified with the logs of the real public expenditures of LRA of 
Portugal, observed between 1947 and 2002. Its sources were the Long Series of the Bank 
of Portugal, between 1947 and 1995, edited by Pinheiro (1997), and between 1996 and 
2002, in which the official report of budgetary execution was consulted, the “Conta Geral 
do Estado”. This variable is composed by all the expenditures that the Portuguese 
Government spends with the decentralized public administration. For the purpose of 
deflationing the nominal series, I followed Musgrave and Musgrave (1980) and Beck 
(1981). The primary deflators were imported from the same sources of real public 
expenditures of LRA. 
LPIBR represents the logs of real Gross National Product of Portugal, from 1947 
to 2002. Its sources were Andrade (2000), between 1947 and 1955, Pinheiro (1997), 
between 1955 and 1995, and the official department of research of Portuguese Ministery 
of Finances, the “Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento (GEE)”, between 1996 and 2002. 
LDESEMP corresponds to the logs of the Number of Unemployed, in Portugal, 
during the observed period. The sources of this series were Pinheiro (1997), until 1995, 
and the GEE, after that observation. 
LFUN symbolizes the logs of the Number of Public Administration Employees 
since 1947 to 2002. Its sources were Neves (1994), between 1947 and 1989, and the 
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official Institute of Employment and Professional Training (“Instituto do Emprego e de 
Formação Profissional”, IEFP), between 1989 and 2002. 
LREC signifies the logs of the Public Revenues, observed between 1947 and 
2002. The sources of this series were the same that were used in the real public 
expenditures of LRA. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
To study the long-term relation among variables, econometricians have been 
purposing the analysis on the possibility of cointegration regressions, since the seminal 
works of Sargan (1964), Davidson, Hendry, Srba and Yeo (1978) or Engle and Granger 
(1987). 
If two variables xt and yt are integrated by the first order, i.e., they are I(1), and if 
they can generate a third one, zt, in a way that 
)0(~ Iz
xyz
t
ttt b-=          (27) 
then, we will identify xt and yt as cointegrated. 
Generally, after recognizing that 
)(~
)(~
bIx
dIy
t
t           
we will identify xt and yt as cointegrated if zt can be characterized as 
ttt xyz b-=          (28) 
)(~ bdIz t -  
with b positive, necessarily. If b is null then zt~I(d) and the relation found between 
xt and yt is called ‘spurious’ according to Granger and Newbold(1974). 
 
To test the null hypothesis of non-cointegration relation, as stated by Hamilton 
(1994), Phillips and Loretan (1991) or Haldrup (1994b), it is previously necessary to 
analyze the stationarity of each series involved in the observed relationship. 
There is a considerable set of tests on stationarity. However, I used the following 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DF-
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GLS) as stated by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996), the Leybourne and McCabe 
(1994) and Dickey and Pantula (1987) tests.  
 
I began with the popular Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. 
The null hypothesis of the ADF identifies the presence of a unit root in the series 
Yt (so, Yt is not stationary). According to this purpose, the significance of d  in the 
regression (29) is observed according to critical values present in Phillips (1987) or in 
MacKinnon (1991). 
å
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1121 eadbb      (29) 
In (29), tYD  identifies the series of first-differences of Yt and t indicates the 
eventual temporal trend.  
As an answer to the need of identifying the length of lags (p) to be included in the 
test regressions, the cited Information Criteria – Akaike Information Criteria, AIC(p), 
Schwarz Information Criteria, SC(p) or Hannan and Quinn, HQ(p), are frequently used. 
 
Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) also developed a test with the null 
hypothesis identified with the assumption of the non-stationarity of a series. According to 
King (1980), they searched optimizing properties of the test for small samples. 
Identifying dty  with the detrended series of ty , the null hypothesis assumes the 
absence of significance of the coefficient of 0a  in the following regression (30): 
t
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d
t eyyyy +D++D+=D --- 11110 ... aaa      (30) 
As stated by Ng and Perron (1995), I also preferred the Modified Akaike 
Information Criteria (MAIC), for the choice of the lag length to include in the test. 
 
Although these tests (ADF and DF-GLS) returned convergent results, I also used 
the Leybourne and McCabe (1994) test. Contrary to the priors, Leybourne and McCabe 
(1994) test has the null hypothesis assuming the stationarity of a series. Their structural 
model is assumed as the following ( tyL)(f  is identified with a lag operator of yt): 
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te  and th  are independent. 
The results in Table A3 confirmed the presence of double unit-roots in the series 
LDTOT, LPIB, LREC, LDPIB (logs of GNP deflator) and LDDESP (logs of the deflator 
of real public expenditures of LRA) while LDTOTR, LPIBR, LDESEMP and LFUN can 
be characterized as I(1). 
 
To strengthen the evidence of the accused double unit-roots, I used Dickey and 
Pantula (1987) test. It starts from an AR(3) model as (34): 
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This test tries to evaluate the presence of a diminishing number of unit roots, 
descending from 3 (H3) to 0 (H0). After recognizing that the estimated coefficient for 3q  
in (38) is not null, according to a t-test in the regression 
ttt wx eq += -13         (38) 
the null hypothesis of 2 (H2) unit roots against only one can be tested using the 
regression 
tttt wzx eqq ++= -- 1312        (39) 
The null hypothesis of H2 is not rejected if there is evidence in the sense that 2q is 
not significant. 
 
The Table A4 confirms the prior observations: LDTOT, LPIB, LREC, LDPIB and 
LDDESP are I(2) while LPIBR, LDTOTR, LDESEMP and LFUN are I(1). 
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The cointegration among I(2) variables 
 
With the presence of I(2) variables in the cointegration regression, some 
considerations remain. According to Haldrup (1998), there are three kinds of 
cointegration in this context: 
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In this formalization, 5,...,1, =iib  refers to the estimated cointegration vectors 
while the subscript i (i=1 or i=2), associated to Xt variables, indicates the inherent order 
of integration.  
As stated by Granger and Lee (1989), in (40) the variables are multicointegrated 
because they are cointegrated by levels and by their differences. 
In (41) the I(2) variables are only cointegrated by their differences (if they are in 
logs, only their growth rates are cointegrated). 
In (42), we are facing polynomial cointegration (cointegration among I(2) 
variables, I(1) variables and the first differences of I(2) variables). 
Haldrup (1994b) recognizes that when the residual series of a cointegration 
regression, ut, is I(1) or I(2), the F-test of any hypothesis diverges to ¥  with the order 
)(TOp  even if the null is true. Whilst, 
2R  converges to 1 and the Durbin-Watson 
statistic converges to 0. The estimated coefficients for tX 1  converge with a rate of 
)( 1-dp TO  and for tX 2  with a rate of )(
2-d
p TO . 
With this sequence, Haldrup (1994b) developed a set of tests for the null 
hypothesis of the non-cointegration based in the observation in the residuals from the 
regression of cointegration. The null hypothesis is not rejected if some evidence favoring 
the presence of an I(1) or an I(2) series is found. Haldrup (1994b) revealed critical values 
for rejecting the null in function of m1 (the number of I(1) regressors) and of m2 (the 
number of I(2) regressors). 
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Efficient estimation 
 
As suggested by Stock and Watson (1993), the estimated results by Static 
Ordinary Least Squares (SOLS) may not be the most efficient, although, in a 
cointegration relation, they are super-consistent (for a definition of the concepts of 
efficiency and consistency, it is purposed a lecture on Hamilton (1994)). This may 
eventuality be due to the small sample (56 observations). 
In order to get more efficient estimators, I added to the SOLS estimations the 
results from the computation by Dynamic OLS (DOLS), firstly suggested by Saikonnen 
(1991) and preferred in Stock and Watson (1993), and by Non Linear Squares (NLS), 
according to Phillips and Loretan (1991). 
The DOLS method purposes the efficient estimation by adding lags and leads of 
the first-differences of the exogenous series (or second-differences if these exogenous 
series are I(2)) to the cointegration regression. The NLS method substitutes the set of lags 
and leads of the DOLS method by lags of the exogenous variables and by lags of the 
residuals obtained from the cointegration regression. 
 
 
ESTIMATION 
 
Results obtained by SOLS, DOLS and NLS 
 
Table A5 synthesizes the results from the estimation by SOLS, according to (25). 
Considering it, and according to ADF test statistic on the residuals from cointegration 
regression (see Haldrup,1994b), we can reject the hypothesis of cointegration among 
LDTOTR (regressand), LPIBR, LREC, LDESEMP and LFUN.  
However, I also tested the hypothesis of cointegration among a new related 
regressand (percentual relation between real public expenditures of LRA and real GNP) 
and the set of exogenous variables (LREC, LDESEMP and LFUN), according to 
regression (26). 
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According to Haldrup (1994b) and observing the respective series of residuals 
from this cointegration regression, we reject the null hypothesis of a non-cointegration 
relation among LDTOTR-LPIBR, the log of real public expenditures of LRA as a ratio of 
real GNP, and LFUN, the log of the Number of Public Administration Employees, 
LREC, the log of Public Revenues, and LDESEMP, the log of the Number of 
Unemployed. Thus, it is expected that there is a long-term relationship among these 
variables. From a first lecture, the estimated coefficient for LFUN (-0,678) may be 
interpreted as confirming a relation of substitutability between the regressand and the 
public expenditures destined to Public Administration Employees (correlationated with 
LFUN). There are significant and positive elasticities associated to public revenues 
(0,180) and to the Number of Unemployed (0,228). Being essentially constituted by 
Taxes as an instrument of financing public budget deficit, as stated by Barbosa (1997), 
public revenues offer a reason for increasing the proportion of real public expenditures of 
LRA in GNP. The number of Unemployed increases the proportion between the observed 
expenditures and the real GNP. This fact induces that increasing unemployment amplifies 
real public expenditures of LRA, especially, its outlay that is concerned to decentralized 
support (for example, current transfers). 
Table A6 shows the estimated coefficients for the cointegration relations tested in 
(26), following the SOLS, DOLS and NLS methods.  
As it can be verified, the returned estimations by these three methods do not give 
back substantially different values. Thus, it can be expected that LREC remains in an 
interval between 0,16 and 0,18, LDESEMP has its estimated elasticities between 0,23 and 
0,26 and LFUN preserves its estimations between -0,68 and -0,61. 
 
ERROR CORRECTION MODELS AND COINTEGRATION 
 
Under the pretense of evaluating the inherent dynamics of the Model, derived by 
(26), and after rejecting the hypothesis of non-cointegration among the variables, we are 
able to estimate the associated Error Correction Model (ECM): 
ttj
k
j
ij zuzLPIBRLDTOTR ++D+=-D -
=
å 1
1
**)( eda    (43) 
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In a given period, the economic interpretation attributed to e , points to the 
proportion of correction of the verified deviation in the previous observation in order to 
the estimated long-term value. 
This estimation suggests the velocity of adjustment of the Model. In this work, it 
is possible to reveal the speed with which real public expenditures of LRA correct any 
deviation from the projected long-term estimation. 
From the study on Table A7, we can not reject the significance of the estimated 
first lagged coefficient of resulting residual series obtained from the cointegration 
regression. So, it can be interpreted that almost one third (-0,331) of any deviation from 
the long-term estimation, verified in a period, is annually corrected. The Durbin-Watson 
(DW) statistic and the Breusch-Godfrey (BG) test with two lags included allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis of serial correlation present in the model derived from (43). The 
White test also rejects the null of residual heterocedasticity. The ARCH (with two lags) 
and Jarque-Bera (JB) tests return values that certify the desired statistical properties of 
the estimation. 
 
Section 6: Conclusion 
 
This document reports a progressing work developed to test the distinction of 
regimes in the evolution of real public expenditures of local and regional administration 
(LRA) of Portugal, post World War II (1947-2002). 
Its main contribution focuses on Portuguese public finances, specially, on the 
aggregate of decentralized expenditures devoted to local and regional structures. A 
second aim of this research was to find a long-term relation, according to various theories 
of the growth of public expenditures, among real public expenditures of LRA and a set of 
exogenous variables as real GNP, the Number of Public Administration Employees, the 
Number of Unemployed and the Public Revenues. 
The strongest results confirm that real public expenditures of LRA can be 
characterized, between 1947 and 2002, by two states. The state associated to higher rates 
of annual growth of real public expenditures of LRA happened between 1973 and 1988. 
Since 1988, it is highly probable that the reality is characterized by the other state (low 
  
23
23
rates of growth). After recognizing the homogeneity between the analyzed expenditures 
and the real output, the possibility of cointegration remains among the real public 
expenditures of LRA as a percentage of real GNP and the Number of Public 
Administration Employees, the Number of Unemployed and Public Revenues. 
Interestingly, there is a relation of substitutability between the observed ratio and the 
Number of Public Administration Employees (the estimated coefficient is -0,678). But 
the estimated coefficients for the Number of Employees (0,228) and for Public Revenues 
(0,180) indicate that, firstly, real public expenditures of LRA are used to attenuate the 
harmful of local and regional unemployment, and, secondly, that growing public 
revenues may increase the analyzed decentralized expenditures in Portugal. 
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Annexes: Figures and Tables 
 
Figure A1 – Nominal Public expenditures of LRA (logs), 1947-2002 
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Figure A3 - % relation between nominal public expenditures of LRA and nominal GNP 
(logs), 1947-2002 
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Figure A4 - % relation between real public expenditures of LRA and real GNP (logs), 
1947-2002 
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Figure A5 – Filtered, Smoothed and Predicted Probabilities of Regime 1 and 2 associated 
to the growth rates of real public expenditures of Portuguese LRA  (series “DDTOTR”), 
1948-2002 
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Figure A6 – Residual analysis 
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Table A1 – Selection of the number of lags ( r ) to be included in an Autorregression of 
the growth rates of real public expenditures of Portuguese LRA, 1948-2002 
r  0 1 2 3 4 5 
AIC -2,185 -2,176 -2,118 -2,080 -2,021 -2,072 
HQ -2,080 -2,031 -1,947 -1,880 -1,826 -2,066 
SC -2,149 -2,102 -2,007 -1,930 -1,832 -1,843 
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Table A2 – Estimates for the parameters of a Markov-Switching Model of growth rates of 
real public expenditures of Portuguese LRA, 1948-2002 
 Coefficient Standard Error t-value 
Constant    
State 1 (slow growth) 0,045818 0,010024 4,5710 
State 2 (high growth) 0,074616 0,029201 2,5552 
 
 
Table A3 – Statistical values obtained from ADF, DF-GLS and Leybourne and McCabe 
(1994) Tests 
Series (y t) 
t
d yD  ADF  DF-GLS Leybourne 
and McCabe 
(1994) 
 
  Interception Interception 
and Trend 
 Interception Interception 
and Trend  
LPIB d=0 -1.783(3) -2.284(3) -1.688(1) 4.107(1)*** 0.411(1)*** 
 d=1 -1.732(1) -1.550(1) -1.142(2) 2.090(2)*** 0.719(2)*** 
 d=2 -7.620(1)*** -9.358(1)*** -6.688(2)*** 0.090(2)* 0.089(2)* 
LDTOT d=0 0.24(1) 0.237(1) -0.593(1) 3.835(1)*** 0.717(1)*** 
 d=1 -2.481(1) -2.677(1) -2.482(1) 2.606(1)*** 0.513(1)*** 
 d=2 -7.175(1)*** -7.704(1)*** -5.739(1)*** 0.348(1)** 0.116(1)* 
LDDESP d=0 -0.678(1) -1.818(1) -2.073(2) 5.268(2)*** 0.638(2)*** 
 d=1 -1.359(1) -1.039(1) -1.073(4) 1.971(4)*** 0.883(4)*** 
 d=2 -4.489(2)*** -4.569(2)*** -3.822(2)*** 0.481(2)** 0.203(2)** 
LDPIB d=0 -1.040(2) -2.559(2) -1.546(3) 4.959(3)*** 0.587(3)*** 
 d=1 -1.304(1) -1.542(1) -1.222(1) 2.035(1)*** 0.873(1)*** 
 d=2 -11.318(1)*** -11.360(1)*** -4.514(2)*** 0.435(2)** 0.187(2)** 
LREC d=0 0.063(3) 0.729(3) -0.054(3) 4.196(3)*** 0.740(3)*** 
 d=1 -1.872(2) -1.548(2) -1.956(2) 3.157(2)*** 0.572(2)*** 
 d=2 -9.478(2)*** -10.463(2)*** -9.404(2)*** 0.090(2)* 0.089(2)* 
LDESEMP d=0 -1.589(2) -1.209(2) -1.673(2) 3.312(2)*** 0.597(2)*** 
 d=1 -5.197(1)*** -5.441(1)*** -5.209(1)*** 0.138(1)* 0.128(1)** 
 d=2 -7.473(3) -8.111(3)*** -7.440(3)*** 0.016(3)* 0.085(3)* 
LFUN d=0 -0.637(3) -0.092(3) -0.740(3) 3.821(3)*** 0.680(3)*** 
 d=1 -4.433(3)*** -4.545(3)*** -4.460(3) 0.079*(3) 0.003(3)* 
 d=2 -6.221(1)*** -6.642(1)*** -6.213(1)*** 0.008(1)* 0.002(1)* 
LPIBR=LPIB-LDPIB d=0 -1.534(2) -1.663(2) -1.825(2) 3.034(2)*** 0.584(2)*** 
 d=1 -4.333(1)*** -4.661(1)*** -3.767(3)*** 0.668(3)** 0.137(3)** 
 d=2 -8.863(3)*** -9.512(3)*** -6.911(3)*** 0.030(3)* 0.034(3)* 
LDTOTR= 
LDTOT-LDDESP 
d=0 
-0.358(3) -0.403(3) -1.008(2) 3.565(2)*** 0.672(2)*** 
 d=1 -4.534(2)*** -4.876(2)*** -3.907(1)*** 0.678(1)** 0.135(1)** 
 d=2 -7.841(2)*** -8.418(2)*** -6.202(1)*** 0.183(1)* 0.111(1)* 
LDTOTR-LPIBR d=0 -0.529(3) -0.587(3) -1.127(2) 3.488(2)*** 0.659(2)*** 
 d=1 -5.055(2)*** -5.434(2)*** -4.268(1)*** 0.442(1)** 0.132(1)** 
 d=2 -8.826(1)*** -9.473(1)*** -6.885(1)*** 0.026(1)* 0.037(1)* 
Note: *,**,*** identify the significance level when the null is rejected by, respectively, a level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
The column of t
d yD  identifies the order of differencing in each series (y t) from 0 (levels of the series) to 2 (second-differences of 
yt). 
Between parentheses “(…)” the number of preferred lags appears according to the Bayesian Schwarz Criteria, in the columns 
associated to the ADF test. The preferred lag length, in DF-GLS and Leybourne and McCabe (1994) tests, was chosen respecting the 
MAIC as stated by Ng and Perron (1995). 
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TABLE A4 – Statistic values obtained from Dickey-Pantula (1987) test  
Series (yt) 
1ˆ1
ˆ/ˆ
q
sq  
2ˆ2
ˆ/ˆ
q
sq  
LPIB … -0.643 
LDTOT … -1.456 
LDDESP … -0.886 
LDPIB … -0.841 
LREC … -0.998 
LDESEMP 0.574 -5.175*** 
LFUN -2.459* -3.498*** 
LPIBR -1.878* -3.358*** 
LDTOTR -2.573* -3.228*** 
LDTOTR-LPIBR -1.133 -4.929*** 
Note:  *,**,*** identify the significance level when the null is rejected by, respectively, a 
level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
TABLE A5 – SOLS Estimation of the cointegration regression (25) (significance levels - 
10%: *,  5%: **, 1%: ***) 
 LDTOTR 
C -4.018* 
(2.269) 
LPIBR 0.626*** 
(0.116) 
LREC 0.199*** 
(0.024) 
LDESEMP 0.121** 
(0.053) 
LFUN -0.008 
(0.263) 
ADF -3.924 
Note: Below the estimated coefficients, between parentheses, the respective standard 
errors are evidenced. 
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TABLE A6 – SOLS, DOLS and NLS Estimations of the cointegration regression (26) 
(significance levels- 10%: *,  5%: **, 1%: ***) 
Estimation Method SOLS DOLS NLS 
Dependent Variable LDTOTR-LPIBR LDTOTR-LPIBR LDTOTR-LPIBR 
C 1.048 
(1.773) 
0.370 
(5.934) 
0.889 
(2.580) 
LREC 0.180*** 
(0.025) 
0.156* 
(0.083) 
0.176*** 
(0.037) 
LDESEMP 0.228*** 
(0.045) 
0.261** 
(0.101) 
0.246*** 
(0.059) 
LFUN -0.678*** 
(0.174) 
-0.609 
(0.594) 
-0.668*** 
(0.254) 
ADF -4.063* … … 
Note: Below the estimated coefficients, between parentheses, the respective standard 
errors are evidenced 
 
 
TABLE A7 – Estimation of the Error Correction Model derived from (43) 
 
1ˆ -te  R
2 SER DW JB BG ARCH White 
)( LPIBRLDTOTR -D  -0.331*** 
(0.103) 
0.179 0.078 1.661 2.843 3.543 6.807 11.906 
Note: Below the estimated coefficient, between parentheses, the respective standard error 
is evidenced 
 
